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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
AND
BUS TRANSPORTATION
In 1941 the Supreme Court of Mississippi declared that
the constitutional barrier which secures the independence
of church and state ". . must not be so high that the
state, in discharging its obligation as parens patriae, can-
not surmount distinctions which, viewing the citizen as
a component unit of the state, become irrelevant."1 The
state must exercise vigilance in discharging its obligations
to those who, although actively engaged in religious prac-
tice, are also objects of its bounty and care, and who,
regardless of any other affiliation, are nonetheless wards
of the state. Furthermore, continued the court, "there is
no requirement that the church should be a liability to
those of its citizenship who are at the same time citizens
of the state, and entitled to privileges and benefits as
such."2
This same idea was succinctly expressed by Thomas
Jefferson when he declared in his "Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom" that "our civil rights have no de-
pendence on our religious opinions."
These statements of Jefferson and the Mississippi court
are based on principles of religious liberty and equality
under the law. Whatever the individual's religious belief
and practice, his privileges and duties as a citizen are
neither more nor less than those of his fellow citizens.
Whatever the individual's religious belief and practice, the
duties and rights of the state in his regard are neither
more- nor less than they are in the case of his fellow
1 Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706,
710 (1941).
2 !bid.
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citizens. In the distribution of its benefits, as in the im-
position of its obligations, the state must look upon its
citizens with a gaze that throws out of focus any credal
background.
Religious liberty demands freedom from both previous
restraints and subsequent punishments. When civil in-
capacitations and economic reprisals are imposed on the
exercise of religion, religious liberty is being abridged. If
a citizen is denied the right to share in welfare benefits
because of his religious belief, his religious freedom is
'being violated.
When courts in the interpretation of similar and identi-
cal constitutional principles and provisions reach contra-
dictory conclusions in matters involving our fundamental
liberties, it is imperative that students of civil liberties
assess the reasoning of the several courts and, if necessary,
take issue with the line of reasoning employed. It is the
purpose of the present writer to assess the reasoning of
a number of courts in cases involving the right of children
who exercise their religious liberty in the choice of school
to share equally with other children in such welfare legis-
lation as bus transportation.
I.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution declares
in part: "No State shall . .. deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The
full meaning and importance of this clause has been slow
to evolve because of judicial reluctance to carry out the
intent and purpose of this part of the amendment.3 Recent
years, however, have seen considerable and. substantial
3 Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of Laws, 37 CA=F. L.
REv. 342 (1944).
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progress4 in the development of the equality doctrine' as
is evidenced by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States.6
Though "the equal protection clause .. .is not suscep-
tible of exact delimitation,"'  its meaning has gradually
evolved through judicial formulations. In one case the
Supreme Court declared that ". . . the equal protection
of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."'
That is, laws must themselves be fair-"equal." This for-
mulation has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the courts.9
Justice Field clarified the meaning of the equality clause
when he declared that such legislation necessarily "...
affects alike all persons similarly situated. . . ."'o The Su-
preme Court later stated that the fourteenth amendment
".... requires that all persons ... shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privi-
leges conferred and in the liabilities imposed."'"
4 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
5 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
6 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1945). In the Shelley case,
supra note 4, the Court held that the state may not enforce restrictive cove-
nants because such action would resut in a denial of the equal protection of
the laws to non-Caucasians; in the Barrows case, smpra note 5, the Court
denied damages for the breach of such covenants; and in the monumental
Brown decision the Court declared that "separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal." See p. 495. See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Re-
gents, 339 US. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Henderson
v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
Missouri ex reL. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); McKissick v. Car-
michael, 187 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951); Corbin v. County School Board, 177
F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1947).
7 Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928).
8 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
9 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Truax
v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S.
540 (1902).
10 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
II Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887). See Old Dearborn Distribut-
ing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 US. 183 (1936); Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404 (1935); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US. 540 (1902);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27
(1885).
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".... [E]quality of rights ... is the foundation of free
government .... arbitrary selection can never be justified
by calling it classification."' Classification may not be arbi-
trary; it "... must rest upon a difference which is real,
S. ." stated Justice Brandeis in dissent in another case,
"so that all actually situated similarly will be treated
alike .... ,,13
Every classification must look to the purpose of the law.
"[T]he object of the classification must be the accomplish-
ment of a purpose or the promotion of a policy, which is
within the permissible functions of the State . . .," so
continued the well reasoned dissent of Justice Brandeis.1'
In another case the Court observed that classification
"... must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike."'  Hence, a reasonable classification includes not
simply all persons who are similarly situated, but rather
all persons who are similarly situated with respect to
the purpose of the law. Classification, therefore, "...
must regard real resemblances and real differences be-
tween things, and persons, and class them in accordance
with their pertinence to the purpose in hand."'"
Legislative classification, declared the Supreme Court
of Indiana, must be based upon some substantial differ-
ence which is ".... germane to the subject and purposes
12 Gulf, C. & SYF.R.R. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160, 159 (1897).
3 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928) (Bran-
deis' dissent).
14 Ibid. (Emphasis added).
15 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). (Emphasis
added).
16 Truax v. Corrigan, 257U.S. 312, 338 (1921). In Sterrett & Oberle Pack-
ing Co. v. Portland, 79 Ore. 260, 154 Pac. 410, 414 (1916), the Supreme Court
of Oregon said: "Where a classification is based upon no reasonable ground
and bears no just or proper relation to the object of the law, but is in fact
an arbitrary selection and results in unjust discriminations, it cannot be
justified, and the act attempting to make such classification must be de-
clared void."
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of the legislation .... "" The criterion of a reasonable clas-
sification is its materiality to the purpose of the law. "The
objects and purposes of a law present the touchstone for
determining proper and improper classification."'"
Constitutional rights are personal rights. ". . . [T]he
essence of the constitutional right," declared Justice
Hughes, "is that it is a personal one.... It is the individual
who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws.... "1 9
This principle was reiterated in Shelley v. Kraemer ° where
the Court asserted that "the rights created by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms,
guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are
personal rights." Stating the principle negatively, the
Court remarked: "Equal protection of the laws is not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequali-
ties." 21
Group membership could not be determinative of an
individual's constitutional rights, because, declared the
Supreme Court in the Gaines segregation case, the "...
petitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an in-
dividual that he was entitled to the equal protection of
the laws.... 22 Twelve years later the Supreme Court
17 Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465, 467 (1927). In
School City of Elwood v. State, 203 Ind. 626, 180 N.E. 471, 474 (1932), the
Supreme Court of Indiana declared: "The classification, to be constitutional,
must be reasonable and natural, not capricious or arbitrary; it must embrace
all who naturally belong to the class, and there must be some inherent and
substantial difference germane to the subject and purpose of the legislation
between those included within the class and those excluded." See also Fair-
child v. Schanke, 113 N.E.2d 159 (Ind. 1953); Evansville & Ohio Valley Ry.
v. Southern Indiana Rural Electric Corp., 231 Ind. 648, 109 N.E.2d 901 (1953);
Martin v. Loula, 208 Ind. 346, 194 N.E. 178 (1935); Bolivar Twp. Board of
Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N.E. 158 (1935); In re Milo Water Co.,
128 Me. 531, 149 Atl. 299 (1930); State v. Cullum, 110 Conn. 291, 147 Atl. 804
(1929); Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 Atl. 240 (1928).
18 State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 922 (1938).
19 McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914).
20 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
21 Id. at 22.
22 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
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again reaffirming the principle that rights are personal,
asserted that "it is fundamental that these [segregation]
cases concern rights which are personal and present."'
The equal protection clause demands, first, that persons
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law
be treated alike, and, secondly, that rights are personal.
II.
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
The first amendment to the Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. "
This final draft of the amendment is considerably clarified
by the more extended form of the original draft intro-
duced in the House of Representatives by James Madison.
The wording of this draft, moreover, has particular signifi-
cance for our present purpose. This initial version of the
amendment stated: 24
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account
of religious belief or worship, nor, shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights
of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, in-
fringed.
The civil rights, whether constitutional or legislative, of
no person shall be abridged on account of his religious
belief or religious exercise. Nor shall a person's rights
of conscience be infringed in any manner whatever -
whether by previous restraints or subsequent reprisals.
Chief Justice Waite declared that the first amendment
of the Constitution ". .. was intended to allow every one
... to entertain such notions respecting his relations to
his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved
23 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950).
24 1 Am ALs OF CONG. 434 (1789-1791).
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by his judgment and conscience.. .. "' In the execution of
these "duties" the individual person is to enjoy complete
freedom, so long as they are ".... not injurious to the equal
rights of others.... "2 6 The state may not violate this free-
dom by the imposition of subsequent punishments, be-
cause, as Jefferson so eloquently declared: '
Almighty God hath created the mind free, and mani-
fested his supreme will that free it shall remain by
making it altogether insusceptible of restraint; that all
attempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or
burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget
habits of hyprocrisy and meanness....
"The guaranties of civil liberty . . .," dissented Justice
Stone, ".. . presuppose the right of the individual to hold
such opinions as he will and to give them reasonably free
expression .... the very essence of the liberty which they
guaranty is the freedom of the individual from compulsion
as to what he shall think and what he shall say. .. ."
Consequently, the individual cannot be compelled "to
bear false witness to his religion,"29 or to renounce it in
whole or in part because of governmental pressures. The
state may not exert pressures, whether by previous re-
straints or subsequent reprisals, that operate as compul-
sions determining what the individual shall think in re-
ligious matters. Nor may it exert unreasonable pressures
that coerce the individual to renounce his religious con-
victions in practice.
The religious liberty guaranty of.the first amendment
is not simply a guaranty against its'obliteration. It guar-
anties the exercise of religion without interference, with-
out obstruction, without the imposition of subsequent re-
25 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
26 Id. at 342.
27 2 THE WoRKs OF THoMAS JEFFESSON 438-439 (Ed. P.L. Ford 1904).
28 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (dissenting
opinion).
29 Id. at 604.
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prisals or the denial of civil rights because of its practice.
This was clearly stated in an important dissent:30
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding
freedom of speech and freedom of religion against
discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On the con-
trary, the Constitution, by virtue of the First and the
Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a
preferred position.
Hence the commands of these amendments are not limited
to cases in which the liberty is being subjected to attack.
"They extend at least to every form of taxation which,
because it is a condition of the exercise of the privilege,
is capable of being used to control or suppress it." 3
Whether the restraint used to control or suppress re-
ligious exercise is in the form of taxation or in the dis-
criminatory denial of equal rights under the law is in-
consequential. Subsequent incapacitations or reprisals, no
less than previous restraints, restrict the free exercise of
religion. The individual has a legal personal right to share
equally in the benefits of the law. If this right is abridged
because of his religious exercise, he is suffering a reprisal
that is restrictive of his religious liberty. Such reprisals
tend to restrict or suppress the exercise of religion.
In the decision which nullified the Jones decision of the
previous year, Justice Douglas stated for the Court that
the flat license tax on the distribution of religious litera-
ture was "a condition of the exercise of... constitutional
privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is
the power to control or suppress its enjoyment."32 Re-
garding the imposition of burdens on the exercise of re-
ligion, the Supreme Court declared that "those who can
tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its
exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources neces-
30 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942).
31 Id. at 608.
32 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943).
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sary for its maintenance."3
Rights guarantied by the first amendment cannot be
restricted by local governmental authority. "A state may
not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted
by the Federal Constitution."34 On the basis of this prin-
ciple, the state may not discriminate in the distribution of
its welfare benefits against individual citizens because
they are engaging in the exercise of a right guarantied by
the first amendment.
The power to impose legal discriminations on the exer-
cise of religion is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment. When civil disqualifications and economic re-
prisals are directly consequent upon the exercise of re-
ligion, the state is suppressing the exercise of religion or
at least making the exercise intolerably burdensome for
those who do not have the resources necessary to supply
the benefits of which they have been deprived. Subsequent
reprisals are often as destructive of religious liberty as are
previous restraints. The citizen who is denied the benefits
of civilized society because of his religious practice does
not enjoy the free exercise of his religion. Discrimination
is the deadly poison of liberty.
By demanding that some of her citizens renounce certain
religious practices as a condition of receiving the equal
protection of the laws, a state grossly violates both the
first and fourteenth amendments. By thus demanding the
surrender of religious beliefs and/or practices as a condi-
tion of equality under the law, the state is openly, though
indirectly, exerting compulsion against the free exercise
of religion. "Official compulsion to affirm what is con-
trary to one's religious beliefs," asserted Justice Murphy,
"is the antithesis of freedom of worship. . . .35 A pari,
33 Id. at 112.
34 Id. at 113.
35 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (con-
curring opinion).
[Vol. XXX
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official compulsion to renounce what is demanded by
one's religious beliefs as a condition of equality under
the law is the antithesis of freedom of religion.
The religious liberty guarantied by the first amendment
is not an absolute. This amendment has two aspects: 36
[It] ... forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance
of any creed or the practice of any form of worship....
[A]nd safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,
-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The .first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot
be.
Of increasing importance during the last decade in the
limitation of religious liberty has been the application of
the clear and present danger test." A district court re-
ferring to the test in invalidating a compulsory flag-salute
statute, asked: ".... must the religious freedom of plain-
tiffs give way because there is a clear and present danger
to the state if these school children do not salute the flag,
as they are required to do?"38 The court found that no
such danger would result if the children were allowed
to refrain from saluting because of their conscientious
scruples. The court set down the principle: "To justify
the overriding of religious scruples .. .there must be a
clear justification therefore in the necessities of national
or community life."39
On appeal to the Supreme Court this decision was af-
firmed and the Gobitis° decision reversed on the grounds
that the refusal of children to salute the flag did not con-
36 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
37 Prior to the adoption of this test other norms had been used to limit
religious exercise, e.g., the traditions and customs of our nation in Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). The clear and present danger test was first ap-
plied in a religious liberty case in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
38 Barnette v. West Virginia, 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W.Va. 1942).
39 Id. at 253-254.
4C Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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stitute a clear and present danger of a kind the state has
a right to prevent.4 Justice Jackson, stating the test, as-
serted that freedom of speech and of press, or assembly
and of worship may not be infringed on slender grounds.
"They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the State may
lawfully protect."42
".... [C]lear and present danger," observed one writer,
"has now become a formidable weapon for the defense of
the First Amendment freedoms .... It is submitted that
on the basis of this doctrine a state may not, conformably
with the guaranty of the first amendment, discriminate
or take economic reprisals against a person because of his
religious exercise unless that exercise creates a clear and
present danger of an evil that the state has a right to
suppress.
The preservation of religious liberty is essential to
the preservation of democracy. The arbitrary violation of
religious freedom debilitates democracy and overrides the
guaranties of the first amendment."
Freedoms are limitable only where vital to the protec-
tion of an imperative paramount interest of the state. It
is an inherent power of sovereignty to regulate conduct
inimical to the public welfare.... These treasured civil
and religious liberties yield only to grave public exigen-
cies.... Individual liberty of conscience, of speech and of
press, may not be indirectly qualified by political in-
capacitations. (Emphasis added.)
4' West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
42 Id. at 639.
43 Green, The Supreme Court, The Bill of Rights and the States, 97
U. OF PA. L. REv. 608, 636 (1949).
41 Morgan v. Civil Service Conm'n, 131 N.J. 410, 36 A.2d 898, 902-903
(1944).
[Vol. XXX
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mi.
FREEDOM OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE
In the light of the foregoing discussion there can be
little doubt as to the constitutional right of the child to
elect, on the basis of religious convictions, to attend a
parochial school because of his desire to learn, in addition
to secular subjects, more about the truths of his particular
religion. Moreover, a child may have a religious duty, in-
cumbent upon him and his parents, to attend a parochial
school. Parents may, in addition, have firm convictions,
based upon a deep faith, that education without God is
partial and incomplete, that education which ignores God
in its curriculum teaches with resounding eloquence that
God is unimportant, or that He has no place in our society,
or even implicitly that He does not exist. These convictions
may induce parents to send their children to parochial
schools.
Regarding the right of parents to send their children to
parochial schools, the Supreme Court declared that the
compulsory public school education law of Oregon ".... un-
reasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardi-
ans to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control."4 Coercive uniformity and conformity
are contrary to the principles of democracy. Taking cog-
nizance of the "additional obligations" of citizens that
transcend the scope and competence of government, the
Court stated: 46
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
45 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (dictum).
46 Id. at 535 (dictum).
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The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.
"While the First Amendment was not mentioned in
the Court's opinion the subsequent absorption of its re-
ligious clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment seems to
make the case relevant to the question of their proper
interpretation."'4 This is borne out by the Court in another
case where, citing the Pierce doctrine as authority, it de-
clared that "this Court has said that parents may, in the
discharge of their duty under state compulsory education
laws, send their children to a religious rather than a pub-
lic school ... ""
Four years prior to the Everson decision, the Court had
declared in the Barnette flag-salute case that both parent
and child ". . . stand on a right of self-determination in
matters that touch individual opinion and personal atti-
tude."'49 Further urging the unacceptability of coercive
action towards uniformity in matters of personal convic-
tions, the Court stated:50
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein. If there are any cir-
cumstances which permit an exception, they do not
now occur to us.
47 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 765 (1953). This
analysis and interpretation of the Constitution was prepared by the Legis-
lative Reference Service under the editorship of Edward S. Corwin in 1953.
Writers consider the Pierce case an important decision in the constitutional
law of civil religious liberty. See PFF'rE, CHURCH, STATE AND FaEEDO
513-515 .(1953); Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14 LAw
& CONTEMP. PaOD. 73, 74-76 (1949). It is significant that the Pierce case is
included in HowE, CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNIED STATES (1952).
It is also included in AMERICAN STATE PAPERs ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION (1949).
48 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
49 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943).
50 Id. at 642.
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We think the action of the local authorities in com-
pelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitu-
tional limitations on their power and invades the sphere
of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all
official control.
The highest court of New York recognized the prior
rights of parents in the education of their children when
it declared that "the State has no desire to and could not
if it so wished compel children to attend the free public
common schools when their parents desire to send them
to parochial schools ... ""
The Supreme Court has spoken in forceful terms of the
rights of parents and children. 2 The Court repeatedly has
emphasized these rights. 3 In terms that recall the princi-
ples of the Declaration of Independence, they reiterated
the priority of the rights of parents in the direction and
education of their children.'
An analysis of the Everson opinion reveals another
strong judicial argument in defense of the right of children
to attend parochial schools on the basis of their religious
convictions. Justice Black argued for the majority of the
Court that, because of the religious liberty guaranty of
the first amendment, "New Jersey cannot hamper its
51 Judd v.'Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576, 582 (1938).
52 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
53 Id. at 165-66. (1) "The rights of children to exercise their religion,
and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage them in the
practice of religious belief... ." Cf. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
supra. (2) ". . the parents' authority to provide religious with secular
schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the state's require-
ment of attendance at public schools." Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
supra. (3) ". . children's rights to receive teaching in languages other than
the nation's common tongue... ." Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
54 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor.hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition of
this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."
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citizens in the free exercise of their own religion,"' i.e.,
New Jersey cannot discriminate against those children
who have exercised their religious liberty in the choice
of school. "Consequently," he continued, "[New Jersey]
cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, . . . or
the members of any other faith, because of their faith,
or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation.""6 The individuals in question in the instant
case were parochial school children. They may not be
denied welfare benefits because of their religious exercise
in the choice of school. Finally, the Court cautioned that
in ts zeal to prohibit state aid to religion, "we must be
careful ... to be sure that we do not inadvertently pro-
hibit New Jersey from extending its general state law
benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious
belief.""7 Again, the religious belief in question was that
involved in the choice of school on the basis of religious
convictions.
The individual child who desires, in the exercise of
his religion, to attend a parochial school is protected
against the abridgment of his right by the first amend-
ment. Concerning the child's "relations to his Maker and
the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner
in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief
on those subjects, no interference can be permitted, . ..
declared the Supreme Court in Davis v. Beason'--with
the usual reservations. If the child, through his parents,
believes that his relations to his Maker impose the obli-
gation of attending a school that will teach him sacred
subjects in addition to secular subjects, there is no state
official, high or petty, who may infringe upon this right.
Under the Constitution the child "was granted the right
55 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
56 ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
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to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the
verity of his religious views." 9"
IV.
BUS TRANSPORTATION: AID TO THE CHILD
Inasmuch as judicial opinion is sharply divided as to
whether or not bus transportation for school children is
primarily for the benefit of the child or in aid of the school,
the writer proposes to treat the transportation cases from
two viewpoints: first, from the viewpoint of the courts
which hold that the services are primarily for the benefit
of the child; and, secondly, from the viewpoint of the
courts which hold that the service is primarily in aid of
the school.
In 1938 it was held by the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land that, since children are the primary beneficiaries of
bus transportation, such welfare benefits may be ex-
tended to parochial school children. ° The board of edu-
cation contended that the transportation of parochial
school children was a diversion of public funds to a pri-
yate purpose, and a contribution to the maintenance of a
place of worship in contravention of the Declaration of
Rights of the state. 1
The Maryland court considered the first contention un-
der two aspects: (1) whetherit was in the furtherance
of a public function to compel children to attend some
school, and (2) whether it was in the" furtherance of a
public function to protect school children from traffic
hazards. The state's interest in the public function of
education is evidenced by the enactment of a compulsory
59 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
60 Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 At/. 628 (1938).
61 Id. at 629.
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school attendance law. Parochial school children, once
having elected to attend a denominational school, have
a duty under the attendance law to attend that school. 2
Since these children "are complying with the law in going
to such a school as the parochihl school involved in this
case," declared the court, "their accommodation in the
buses appears to the court to be within the proper limits
of enforcement of the duty imposed." 3 The state, having
imposed the duty of attendance at a public, private, or
parochial school, has the power to make compliance with
the duty easier.
Furthermore, the state has the power to protect its
children from dangers while they are carrying out duties
imposed by law. "Compliance having been made danger-
ous in a much greater degree," stated the court, "removal
of the danger to any extent would seem to be within the
same public function.""
With regard to the contention that the transportation
provision aids sectarian schools, the court enunciated a
principle that is basic in all legislation for the public wel-
fare. "The fact that the private schools, including paro-
chial schools, receive a benefit from it," declared the
court, "could not prevent the Legislature's performing
the public function." 5 The conclusion that the transpor-
tation act "must be regarded as one within the function
of enforcing attendance at school," reasoned the court,
"renders it unnecessary to consider separately the ob-
jection that a religious institution is aided."6 Add to this,
there is no substantial and direct aid given to parochial
schools. "The institution must be considered as aided only
incidentally, the aid only a byproduct of proper legis-
62 Id. at 63L
63 Id. at 632.
r4 d.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
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lative action." 7
In this reasoning of the court of appeals, the right of
the individual child to share in the welfare benefits of
his state was treated as a personal right. Consequently,
the court found that incidental secondary effects of the
welfare law providing transportation could not deprive
parochial school children of the right to share in welfare
benefits equally with other children similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law.
This interpretation of constitutional principles was re-
affirmed by the court of appeals four years later in another
case involving state aid for the transportation of children
attending parochial schools."
An act provided "for the transportation to and from
school of children attending schools in St. Mary's County
not receiving state aid."69 Under the terms of the act,
public funds were distributed, upon contractual agree-
ments, on a mileage basis for the operation of parochial
school owned buses. The provision was attacked, among
other reasons, as "unconstitutional because it authorizes
the application of public funds to private purposes."7 ° The
court referred to a former case in which the doctrine was
enunciated that the city might contract with private
agencies to give the care and training to foundlings which
it was the duty of the city to provide. The denominational
control of institutions with which contracts were made,
runs the doctrine, does not disqualify them for serving as
the agencies of the city."2
In the case before the court, the parochial schools be-
came the agents of the county in the transportation of
67 Ibid.
68 Adams v. Conim'rs, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377 (1942).
69 Id. at 378.
70 Ibid.
71 St. Mary's Industrial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 310, 335 (1898).
72 Adams v. Comm'rs, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377, 380 (1942).
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children. The court said: 7
If the county's carrying the children of parochial
schools by any means is a valid action, as we have de-
cided in the Wheat case, one not necessarily to be con-
sidered a gift to the schools, the joining with the schools
in supporting facilities already provided would seem
valid.
Equality of treatment for all children, regardless of
religious belief and practice, was finally attained by St.
Mary's County in the matter of transportation in 1941. The
act, said the court, "gave a right to all children attending
schools in the county not receiving state aid, ... to trans-
portation . . . on the same terms [as public school chil-
dren].... ."7 In this enactment Maryland adhered to the
ideals of religious liberty set forth in the first amendment
to our Constitution, and provided for equal protection of
the laws as guarantied by the fourteenth amendment. All
the school children of the county who are similarly situ-
ated with respect to a particular need are treated alike. The
need is a personal one. The right of the individual child to
share equally in state provided benefits designed to alle-
viate a need common to a class is a "personal one" granted
and guarantied by the fourteenth amendment.
Two years after the Court of Appeals of Kentucky had
declared bus transportation for parochial school children
unconstitutional75 as giving aid to the school, the general
assembly enacted another law for the express purpose of
extending these welfare benefits to children who had
elected to attend parochial schools. The purpose of the
statute, according to its preamble, was "to promote the
public welfare, comfort, health and safety" of children
"attending school in compliance with the compulsory
73 Ibid.
74 Id. at 379.
75 Sherrard v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d
963 (1942).
[Vol. XXX
1955] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND BUS TRANSPORTATION 403
school attendance laws."7 Bus transportation, the assem-
bly intimated, is an aid to the child, since "the safety of
all children is greatly endangered by their walking along
highways without sidewalks to and from school and their
health is greatly endangered in inclement weather; .... "77
Consequently, "in order to facilitate their compulsory
attendance at some school and to give aid and protection
to children on the highways," the state authorized each
county to furnish transportation to parochial school child-
ren "from its general funds."'
In Nichols v. Henry79 it was, nevertheless, charged that
the statute was invalid under the Kentucky constitution.'3
The court of appeals, accepting the legislative purpose as
stated, declared that the act "constitutes simply what it
purports to be - an exercise of police power for the pro-
tection of childhood against the inclemency of the weather
and from the hazards of present-day highway traffic."8"
Furthermore, declared the court, the mere circumstance
of sectarian teaching in Catholic and Protestant schools
"does not change the purpose or effect of the Act nor...
does it . . . compel any person to . . . contribute to the
... maintenance of any ... place [of worship] .... 2)82
It was also contended that the transportation of paro-
chial school children involved the expenditure of public
money for a private purpose.8 3 However the court declared
76 Ky. Acts 1944, c. 156, as cited in Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191
S.W.2d 930, 931 (1945).
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (1945).
80 Id. at 932.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid. Ky. CONST. § 5 declared that "the civil rights, privileges or
capacities of no person shall be taken away, or in any wise diminished or
enlarged, on account of his belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma
or teaching. No human authority shall . . . control or interfere with the
rights of conscience."
83 Note 79, supra at 933.
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that, in the light of progress in the field of humane and
social legislation, and in view of the increased hazards
and dangers of the highways,-and in consideration of the
compulsofy school attendance laws applying to all child-
ren, "it cannot be said with any reason or consistency that
tax legislation to provide our school children with safe
transportation is not tax legislation for a public purpose.""
The court, answering the charge that the legislation
was in aid of religion, declared: "Neither can it be said
that such legislation, or such taxation, is in aid of a
church, or of a private, sectarian, or parochial school, nor
that it is other than what it is designed and purports to
be, . . . - legislation for the health and safety of our
children, the future citizens of our state."' The indirect
and incidental benefits that may accrue to the parochial
school do not vitiate the primary and principal purpose
of the legislation. "The fact that in a strained and technical
sense the school might derive an indirect benefit from
the enactment," said the court, "is not sufficient to defeat
the declared purpose and the practical and wholesome
effect of the law." 6 Thus the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky unanimously upheld the right of children to exer-
cise their religion in the choice of school they wish to
attend, without suffering economic reprisals.
A year before the important Supreme Court decision87
involving the right of parochial school children to share
in bus transportation facilities, a California court handed
down a noteworthy decision.'
Plaintiff in the California case attacked the validity of the
Educational Code which permitted any school district to
transport parochial school children "upon the same terms
84 Id. at 934.
s5 Id. at 934-35.
86 Ibid.
87 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
s8 Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946).
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and in the same manner and over the same routes of
travel as is permitted pupils attending the district school."'
It was contended that this provision violated the article
of the state constitution prohibiting any aid to religious
schools. ° It was further contended that the provision vio-
lated the constitution in that it prohibited appropriation
in support of religious schools.9
The court quoted with approval a principle enunciated
in an earlier case,92 namely, that a statute "is not to be
declared invalid, because, incidental to the main purpose,
there results an advantage to individuals."93 Also quoting
the same decision, the court declared that "the legislature
is vested with large discretion in determining what is
for the public good and what are public purposes for
which public moneys can be rightfully expended and
that discretion cannot be controlled by the courts except
when its action is clearly evasive."9
With regard to the all important question as to whether
the child or the school is the primary beneficiary of the
transportation provision, the court declared: 9
It is generally held that the direct benefit conferred is
to the children with only an incidental and immaterial
benefit to the private schools; that this indirect benefit is
89 Id. at 257.
90 Id. at 258.
91 Ibid.
92 People v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 42 Cal. App. 2d 409, 108 P.2d
923, 926 (1941).
93 Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256, 258 (1946).
94 Ibid.
95 Id. at 260. Justice Marks found a guide in the statement of Chief
Justice Hughes of the United States Supreme Court in Cochran v. Louisiana
Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930). The Supreme Court, in holding
the distribution of textbooks to parochial school children valid, said through
Chief Justice Hughes: "Viewing the statute as having the effect thus
attributed to it, we cannot doubt that the taxing power of the state is
exerted for a public purpose. The legislation does not segregate private
schools, or their pupils, as its beneficiaries or attempt to interfere with
any matter of exclusively private concern. Its interest is education, broadly;
its method, comprehensive. Individual interests are aided only as the com-
mon interest is safeguarded"
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not an appropriation of public moneys for private purposes
and does not violate any constitutional provisions against
giving State aid to denominational schools.
The transportation of children to parochial schools
serves a public purpose. This is the conclusion reached by
the California court when it declared that relevant de-
cisions reviewed "support the theory that where the main
purpose of an enactment is lawful, and an incidental or
immaterial benefit results to some person or organization,
which benefit is not directly permitted by law, this inci-
dental benefit alone will not defeat the legislation, its
main purpose being lawful."9
Furthermore, the primary beneficiary of the transporta-
tion provision is the child. On the basis of the public pur-
pose principle, the district court concluded that: 97
If the transportation of pupils to and from public
schools is authorized, as it certainly is, and if the benefit
from that transportation is to the pupils, than [sic] an
incidental benefit flowing to a denominational school
from free transportation of its pupils should not be
sufficient to deprive the legislature of the power to
authorize a school district to transport such pupils.
Reasoning from the already approved9 8 transportation
of veterans to numerous denominational colleges and uni-
versities, the court maintained that: 
If the direct payment by the State of the transportation
costs of the veteran between his home and such an
institution of learning ... is not a violation of the con-
stitutional provisions, then certainly permitting a little
child to occupy a vacant seat in a school bus in order that
he might attend a denominational school cannot be held
to be such a violation.
The court, reverting to the question of incidental aid
96 Id. at 261.
97 Id.
98 Veterans' Welfare Bd. v. Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678 (1922).
99 Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App.2d 653, 167 P.2d 256, 262 (1946).
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to denominational schools, noted that in the complexities
of modern life "many expenditures of public money give
indirect and incidental benefit to denominational schools
and institutions of higher learning. Sidewalks, streets,
roads, highways, sewers are furnished for the use of all
citizens regardless of religious belief."'0 0 The California
court, moreover, reduced the expression of the New York
Court of Appeals in the Judd'0 ' case-"without [bus trans-
ported] pupils there could be no school"-to absurdity by
observing that "without roads over which pupils could
reach the school there would be no school.' 110 2
Since "the promotion of the safety of the children of
the State is an important function of government, just as
much so as their education,"' 3 and since the right of a
child to share equally in the welfare benefits of the state
canknot be annulled by incidental and immaterial second-
ary effects, the court held that "the legislation [providing
transportation for parochial school children] is constitu-
tional and is not subject to the attack made here."'"
Although the decision of the Supreme'Court of New
Jersey in the Everson case" 5 was adverse to the interests
of children in attendance at parochial schools, it should be
discussed here because the dissenting opinion of Justice
Heher formed the basis for subsequent favorable decisions.
The legislation in question was set forth by the court.
It provided for equal transportation facilities for children
attending "any school house... including the transporta-
tion of school children to and from school other than a
public school, except such school as is operated for profit
100 Ibid.
101 Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576, 582 (1938).
102 See Note 99, supra.
103 Ibid.
10- Id. at 263.
305 Everson v. Board of Education, 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A-2d 75 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
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in whole or in part."" So also the applicable constitutional
provisions were set forth.107
The supreme court found that the legislative provision
for the transportation of parochial school children was
unconstitutional as a misappropriation of the constituted
fund for the support of free schools.' 8 This holding was
based upon the judicial viewpoint that transportation is
primarily in aid of the school and only secondarily or
incidentally a benefit for the children transported.
Inasmuch as the substance of Justice Heher's dissent
was to become accepted doctrine in the New Jersey Court
of Errors and Appeals' decision,"° reversing the holding
of the supreme court, it deserves consideration here. Jus-
tice Heher disagreed with the majority on the fundamental
question of who is the beneficiary of bus transportation.
"Such transportation is a service to the children and their
parents rather than to the schools," declared the Justice,
"for otherwise the parents would be obliged to provide
the conveyance or incur the traffic hazards incident to
the journey, for which children are generally so ill-equip-
ped.""' Such service to children, continued the minority,
"is in no real sense a contribution to 'the use' or the main-
tenance of the institutions which the children attend....
and such provision is in the exercise of what I deem to be
an unquestionable public function.""'
The distinction between aid to the child and his parents,
on the one hand, and aid to the school, on the other, is
fundamental. Concerning this distinction, Justice Heher
106 Id. at 76.
107 Id. at 76-77.
LOS Id. at 76.
1o9 Everson v. Board of Education, 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1945).
110 Everson v. Board of Education, 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75, 77 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
Ill Ibid.
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said: '
If this transportation provision be viewed apart from
the institutions themselves, and considered as an aid to
parents in making educational facilities of their choice
available to their children with a measure of safety, in
the service of an essential public interest, it seems to me
that constitutional doubts lose their force. As so viewed,
the act is in aid of compulsory education, a primary
concern of society.
Justice Heher based persuasive arguments on the fact
that "school attendance is compulsory." The state, by
reason of its prerogatives, "may compel parents to perform
the natural duty of education owed to their children, and
aid them in so doing, except as restrained by constitutional
limitations."" 3 Constitutional guaranties of religious lib-
erty act as limitations upon the function of the state in
the educational field. Consequently, "compulsory attend-
ance at a public school, whether the compulsion be direct
or indirect, would violate constituutional guaranties."' 4
The denial to children who have elected to attend a paro-
chial school of the right to share equally with other chil-
dren in such welfare legislation as bus transportation is an
indirect compulsion to attenal a public school. Resisting
the compulsive pressure means suffering economic re-
prisals. This element of constraint violates religious liberty.
In the opinion of the minority, the transportation of
school children has a twofold purpose-to facilitate com-
pliance with the attendance law, and to protect children
against highway hazards. "The statute under review facili-
tates the attendance at both classes of schools; [i.e., public
and private] of children remotely situated," said the Jus-
tice, "and thus contributes substantially to the effectuation
of the statutory provisions for compulsory education, and
u2 Id. at 77-78.
us1 Id. at 77.
114 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
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at the same time considers the factor of safety - a reason-
able measure to those ends."'n In view of these facts, Jus-
tice Heher declared:
I cannot find in any of our constitutional prohibitions a
purpose to deny such transportation to children of non-
profit private schools, seeking the education which
satisfies the standard of the compulsory education law." 6
With regard to the majority holding that the extension
of the welfare provision to parochial school children was
a misappropriation of public school funds, the dissent
declared that "there is no proof whatever that any part of
the State school fund was.., used" for the transportation
of such children. Consequently, since the constitutional
mandate has reference "only to what may be done with
the constituted school fund, not what may be done with
the general funds of the State," it has no relevance in the
instant case." 7 The Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey, to which the decision of the supreme court was
appealed, declared, with reference to this point: "'
A meticulous examination of the record shows an
absolute lack of any such proof....
... [T]he record before us is barren of any evidence as
to the source of the funds from which the challenged pay-
ment ... was made.
Unless there is evidence to the contrary, the court must
assume that the payment was made lawfully from funds
other than the state school fund. The contrary may not
be assumed. The court will presume in favor of the con-
stitutionality of a statute.19
The court brought to notice the fact that "the com-
15 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
"-17 Id. at 79.
118 Everson v. Board of Education, 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A2d 333, 335-36
(Ct. Err. & App. 1945).
119 Id. at 336.
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pulsory education statutes impose on the parents... an
absolute duty.. ." and that these statutes are "penal in
nature for a violation of which parents may be convicted
as disorderly pdrsons, . ....'o Since compliance with the
compulsory attendance law is sometimes "practically im-
possible," and as a result parents may be subjected to
prosecution through no fault of their own, "the statutes
looking to transportation became complementary to and
in aid of the compulsory education statutes."' 1
Furthermore, bus transportation for school children is
welfare legislation for a public purpose. Consequently, the
transportation of children in attendance at parochial
schools "is a public matter and moneys expended therefor
... do not constitute the expenditure of public moneys for
private purposes."' Thus the highest court of New Jersey
did not deprive children who had elected particular schools
on the basis of their religious beliefs of the right to share
in the benefits of welfare legislation on an equal basis with
other children similarly situated with respect to the pur-
pose of the law. These children were not made to suffer
economic reprisals as the price of having exercised a right
guarantied by the first amendment.
On appeal to the Supreme Court appellants contended,
first, that the statute of New Jersey took, by taxation, the
private property of some and bestowed it on others; and,
secondly, that the statute provided for the use of public
money to help support and maintain sectarian schools.'
With reference to the first contention, it was sufficient
for the Court that the New Jersey legislature had decided
that a public purpose would "be served by using tax-
raised funds to pay for the bus fares of all school children,
1 Id. at 337.
121 Ibid.
1=2 Ibid.
323 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US. 1, 5 (1947).
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including those who attend parochial schools."'2 4 What
serves a public need and public purpose is for the state
legislature to determine. "The fact that a state law, passed
to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal desires
of the individuals most directly affected is certainly an
inadequate reason for us to say that a legislature has
erroneously appraised the public need."' z
With the advent of changing conditions and new con-
cepts regarding the function of government, the state has
undertaken new types of public service for the promotion
of the general welfare. Consequently, the Court declared
that it was too late to argue that the legislation served no
public purpose."
Had the Court found the second contention true, trans-
portation for parochial school children would unquestion-
ably have been found unconstitutional since it was in the
Everson case that the Court enunciated the new doctrine
of absolutely no aid to one religion or to all religions.'
The Court, however, viewed transportation as welfare
legislation to which all school children similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law have an equal right.
To deny the benefits of welfare enactments to children
because of their religious belief would be to violate their
rights under the first and fourteenth amendments. The
Court, though zealous in its efforts to prohibit even the
smallest public aid to religion,2 8 was not unaware that
"other language of the [first] amendment commands that
New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise
of their own religion."'29 To deny parochial school children
the right to share equally in the benefits of state welfare
124 Id. at 6.
125 Ibid.
326 Id.. at 7.
127 Id. at 15-16.
328 See McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
29 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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legislation would be to "hamper" them "in the free exer-
cise of their own religions."
On the basis of the first amendment guaranty of the
free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court enunciated
the important principle that the state "cannot exclude
individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists,
Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack
of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legis-
lation."' 3 Such exclusion would be discrimination on re-
ligious grounds - a violation of both the first and four-
teenth amendments.
The Court, referring to the constitutional guaranty of
religious freedom and the equal protection of the laws,
declared that "we must be careful, in protecting the citi-
zens of New Jersey against state-established churches, to
be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey
from extending its general State law benefits to all its
citizens without regard to their religious belief."'' Indi-
vidual citizens have a personal right to share in the benefits
of civilized society. A share in these benefits may not be
denied because an incidental advantage may accrue to
religion as a byproduct. In the distribution of its benefits
the state must be blind to. the religious beliefs of its
citizens.
These principles of liberty induced the Court to hold
that when the state provides transportation for parochial
school children:' 3 '
The State contributes no money to the schools. It does
not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more
than provide a general program to help parents get their
children, regardless of their religion, safely and ex-
peditiously to and from accredited schools.
130 Ibid.
13' Ibd.
3-32 Id. at 18.
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Thus the Supreme Court adopted the viewpoint that
transportation for school children is in aid of the child
and not in aid of the school. " Such transportation serves
a public purpose; consequently, all those children who
are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law must be treated alike. School children may not be
denied the benefits of public welfare legislation because
of their faith.'
V.
BUS TRANSPORTATION: AID TO THE SCHOOL
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin was not called upon
to express its views on the question as to whether the
transportation of school children was a service to the child
or in aid of the school in two cases, 35 but these cases
should be discussed here. In the Van Straten case the
transportation of children to a parochial school was held
invalid by reason of unauthorized exercise of power by the
district school board.'36 A statutory authorization to trans-
port the children of discontinued district schools to schools
in adjoining districts and to pay their tuition there is not,
133 Ibid. The Court emphasized this when it added at p. 18: "The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must
be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.
New Jersey has not breached it here."
134 The writer finds it impossible to reconcile this application of the
principles of religious liberty and the equal protection guaranty of the
fourteenth amendment with the reservations stated by the Court when it
said: "While we do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide
transportation only to children attending public schools.... ." at p. 16. This
puts the Court in the position of saying that while the state "cannot exclude
individual . . . members of any faith, because of their faith . . . from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation," it may, nevertheless,
exclude individuals from receiving "its general state law benefits" because
of their faith.
135 State ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109,192 N.W. 392 (1923);
Costigan v. Hall, 249 Wis. 94, 23 N.W2d 495 (1946).
136 State ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392, 395
(1923).
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said the court, authority to transport children to other
than district schools. Consequently, the court held that
the contract made by the district board to provide trans-
portation of pupils to a private school was an act beyond
its authority and therefore invalid.3
The matter of unauthorized exercise of power by a
district school board was also the issue before the Wis-
consin court in the Costigan case. A statutory provision
that authorized the transportation of the children of a sus-
pended district school to another district school was in
issue."' Since this was the extent of the board's power,
the court held that the transportation of parochial school
children was unauthorized and consequently unlawful on
the principle that "the board has only such powers as to
transportation of pupils as are conferred on it by the
statute."'
13 9
The Superior Court of Delaware took a forthright posi-
tion on the fundamental question as to who is the bene-
ficiary of welfare legislation providing transportation for
school children.' ° "We are of the opinion that to furnish
free transportation to pupils attending sectarian schools,
is to aid the schools," and is, consequently, unconstitu-
tional.' This holding relied on the Delaware constitution
which provided that state appropriated funds for educa-
tional purposes should not be used by, or in aid of any
sectarian church or denominational school. 42 Though
petitioner contended that this prohibition applied only
to appropriations from the school fund and that it did
not apply to appropriations from the general fund, the
137 Ibid.
138 Costigan v. Hall, 249 Wis. 94, 23 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1946).
139 Ibid.
3-4 State el Yel. Traub v. Brown, 6 W.W. Harr. 181, 172 AtI. 835 (Super.
Ct. 1934).
141 Id. at 837.
142 Id. at 836.
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court rejected the contention. 43
Even while applying the constitutional prohibition
against the use of any public funds whatsover in aid of
denominational schools, the court could not show how the
giving of a bus ride to a child amounted to the "appro-
priation" or "use" of public funds in aid of sectarian
schools. Consequently, the court argued that the transpor-
tation of children to parochial schools was unconstitutional
because it "helps build up, strengthen and make successful
the schools as organizations."' 44 If this is the result of
public financed transportation, it is, nevertheless, an inci-
dental intangible benefit accruing to a denominational
school. To avoid such benefits, it was necessary to avoid
such conditions of equality as would enable a child to
choose to attend a parochial school without suffering eco-
nomic reprisals. Children enjoying conditions of equality
with respect to transportation might elect to attend paro-
chial schools. Such conditions would, as a consequence,
"help build up, strengthen and make successful the
schools as organizations." To avoid these consequences.
the supreme court denied to these children the conditions
of equality that are demanded by the fourteenth amend-
ment and are, in many instances, the essential prerequi-
sites to freedom of choice. This amounts to compulsive
attendance at public schools, even against religious con-
victions.
On the basic question as to who primarily benefits from
the transportation of school children, the supreme court,
and the Court of Appeals of the State of New York sharply
disagreed. When the supreme court held 45 that such trans-
portation was in aid of the child, it was reversed by the
court of appeals on the grounds that such welfare legis-
143 Ibid.
'44 Id. at 837.
145 Judd v. Board of Education, 164 Misc. 889, 300 N.Y. Supp. 1037, 1040
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
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lation was in aid of the school.'4 6
Though the results of the decision of the court of ap-
peals in the Judd case have been nullified by a constitu-
tional amendment,'4 7 the considerable influence of the
court opinion in other jurisdictions 48 justifies giving more
space to this case than would normally be given to a
decision whose effects have been substantively altered by
the amending process.
In 1936 the legislature of the State of New York
amended the Education Law in favor of parochial school
children to facilitate compliance with the state compulsory
school attendance law. 49
Plaintiff contended that the law violated Article IX,
section 4, of the state constitution which provides that the
state shall not use its property or public money directly
or indirectly, in aid or maintenance of any school of any
religious denomination.'*0 The supreme court rejected this
contention. "It does not appear that any of the taxpayers'
money.., is being used or spent to aid or maintain the
146 Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 NE.2d 576, 582 (1938).
'47 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (1894) was amended to read that ". . . the
legislature may provide for the transportation of children to and from any
school or institution of learning." This constitutional amendment was chal-
lenged in Application of Board of Education, 199 Misc. 631, 106 N.Y.S2d 615
(Sup. Ct. 1951). The petitioner sought to avoid the acting commissioner of
education's order directing the board of education to provide transportation
for parochial school children. On the basis of the constitutional amendment,
the petition was dismissed.
148 See Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d
198 (1949); Everson v. Board of Education, 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75 (Sup. Ct.
1944); Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist., 17 Wash. 2d 61,135 P.2d 79 (1943).
149 N.Y. EDucAroN LAw § 206, subdivison 18 (1910) provided that "...
whenever in any school district children of school age shall reside so remote
from the school house therein or the school they legally attend that they are
practically deprived of school advantages during any portion of the school
year, the inhabitants thereof entitled to vote are authorized to provide, by tax
or otherwise, for the conveyance of any or all pupils residing therein (a)
to the schools of such city, or district ... or (b) to the school maintained in
said district and to schools, other than public, situate within the district or an
adjacent district or city ......
150 Judd v. Board of Education, 164 Misc. 889, 300 N.Y.Supp. 1037, 1039
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
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denominational school in question." 1 To the important
question as to whether the parochial school would stand
to gain or lose if no means of transportation were afforded
its students, the court answered without qualification that
"it would not."152
The right of children to share equally in welfare benefits
provided by the state is a personal right. In providing bus
transportation for children living a long distance from
the school they legally attend, the state is providing for
the needs of its children. The needs of children as wards
of the state are distinct from the needs of parochial schools
as institutions. On the basis of this primary principle of
the personal rights of the individual, as distinct from the
disabilities of institutions, the court declared that "the
service afforded by this.., law is distinct and independent
of the school itself and is intended solely for the con-
venience of the pupils and to promote their education,
and is not 'aid or maintenance' of a denominational
school .... 
Not only was the question of personal rights relevant
to the case, found the supreme court, but also the question
of religious liberty. "To discriminate against the pupils
of denominational schools would be, in effect, an unreason-
able interference of the rights of their parents in determin-
ing where their children should be educated."'" This
compulsion would be in conflict with the state constitu-
tional provision which provides for religious freedom.'
In the court of appeals this reasoning of the supreme
court was totally rejected. Faced with the argument that
was conclusive in the supreme court, namely, that the
transportation of children primarily benefits the children
15' Id. at 1040.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1894).
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and not the school, the court af appeals, brushing aside
the reasoning, declared: "That argument is utterly with-
out substance."1 6 Children may not be transported to paro-
chial schools because "free transportation of pupils induces
attendance at the school." Furthermore, "the purpose of
transportation is to promote the interests of the private
school or religious or sectarian institution that controls
and directs it."' 7 The court did not show if and how the
constitutional prohibition against the use of the state's
property or credit or any public money in aid of any school
under the control of any religious denomination was vio-
lated.158
The court's conclusion, however, that "free transpor-
tation of pupils induces attendance at the school," amounts
to a finding that treating equally all children similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law creates
conditions which make possible the free exercise of re-
ligion - an exercise that does not entail consequent eco-
nomic reprisals - in the choice of school. The court held
in effect that this condition of religious freedom must be
avoided because it "induces" attendance at parochial
schools and "promotes" the interest of these schools. Con-
ditions of equality make possible freedom of choice. Free-
dom of choice makes possible the election to attend a de-
nominational school. It is submitted that in restricting
this freedom of choice and freedom of conscience the
Court of Appeals of New York violated religious liberty
and the equality guaranty of the fourteenth amendment.
This abridgment of religious liberty hardly meets the
minimum requirements of the clear and present danger
rule. Must the religious freedom of school children be
abridged because there is a clear and present danger to
the state if these children are permitted to choose to
M6 Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576, 592 (1938).
17 Ibid.
318 Id. at 580.
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attend parochial schools free of economic reprisals? Does
the avoidance of this "inducement" to attend parochial
schools justify violating the religious liberty of school
chlldren?
If bus transportation can be denied to parochial school
children because it is a sine qua non necessity for the op-
eration of parochial schools, as the court intimated by
arguing that "without pupils there could be no school,""'59
then, for the same reason, these children could be denied
the use of public streets and sidewalks. If the essentiality
of transportation makes it an unconstitutional aid to de-
nominational schools, a fortiori the essentiality of streets
and sidewalks makes them unconstitutional aids to denom-
inational schools. And if these may be denied to children
attending a school that teaches religion, a fortiori they may
be denied to people on their way to a church, a synagogue,
or religious assembly. With regard to the essentiality of
transportation for the operation of schools, it should be
observed that schools long existed before buses came into
vogue.
If children attending parochial schools may be deprived
of the personal right to share equally in welfare benefits
because of an immaterial benefit that may accrue to de-
nominational schools as a result of such sharing, on what
basis can such substantial aids as police protection, tax
exemption, sewer connections, fire protection, and com-
pulsory attendance at sectarian schools be approved?
In 1941 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the
transportation of children to parochial schools was pri-
marily in aid of the school as such. 6 The state statute in-
validly incorporated the equality principle of the four-
teenth amendment. It provided that all children attending
any private or parochial school under the compulsory
159 Id. at 582.
360 Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941).
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school attendance laws of this State shall be equally en-
titled to the same rights, benefits and privileges as to trans-
portation that are provided by the district school board. 61
The Oklahoma constitution has the usual prohibition
with regard to the use of public funds for a sectarian
institution as such.'62
Plaintiff urged, among other things, that the transporta-
tion provision did not result in the use of public funds
for the benefit or support of the sectarian institution "as
such," but that the benefit accrued to the individual child
as distinguished from the school as an organization." 3 The
emphasis was placed on the personal right of the individual
child to share in the benefits of the welfare legislation of
the state.
The supreme court of the state, however, held that such
welfare legislation as transportation is primarily in aid of
the sectarian school. "When pupils of a parochial school
are transported . .. such service ... [is] in aid of that
school."' 64 Though the purpose of the enactment was to
give "the same rights, benefits and privileges as to trans-
portation" to all children complying with the compulsory
attendance laws, the court declared that "when such aid is
purported to be extended to a sectarian school there is in
our judgment a clear violation of ... our Constitution.' ' 65
Under this holding the individual parochial school child
is burdened with the constitutional disabilities of the school
he legally attends. Though his right to share equally with
other children in welfare benefits is a personal right, this
right is annulled because of his religious beliefs. By reason
of the fact that the child has exercised a right guarantied
1L61 Id. at 1003.
162 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5. Ibid.
163 Ibid.
1.64 Id. at 1004.
165 Ibid. On appeal of this decision to the Supreme Court of the United
States it was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Gurney v. Ferguson, 317
U.S. 588 (1942).
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and protected by the first amendment, he is deprived of the
right to share in the benefits of welfare legislation on an
equal basis with other children similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of the law.'66
In Kentucky the court of appeals, citing the Gurney
decision as persuasive authority, reversed a circuit court
and held the law providing bus transportation for children
attending parochial schools unconstitutional.' 67 The law
thus annulled had provided that "pupils attending private
schools shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges
as to transportation to and from school as are provided for
pupils of public schools."' 68
The question of who benefits by the transportation of
children to school was clearly raised in the Kentucky case.
Appellant contended that the enactment constituted a mis-
use of public school funds and an appropriation of public
funds for a sectarian purpose.'69 Defendants contended
that the act: 17o
* * .was a valid exercise of police power and that
children attending private schools were merely com-
plying with compulsory laws of this State and were under
the supervision of the State Board of Education . . .
and [that] the Act was for the aid of the pupils and not
for aid of the schools.
Though the Kentucky court conceded that the issues
and principles involved in the textbook case' 7' decided by
-66 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court
of the United States made the first amendment guaranty of religious liberty
applicable against state violations by way of the fourteenth amendment.
367 Sherrard v. Board of Education, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (1942).
168 Id. at 964.
169 Id. at 965-66. Ky. CONST. § 171 as far as is pertinent, reads: ".
Taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only.. . ." Section 183
states: "The general assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for
an efficient system of common schools throughout the state." Section 184
provides, among other things, that: "No sum shall be raised or collected for
education other than in common schools until the question of taxation is
submitted to the legal voters...
170 Id. at 964.
171 Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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the Supreme Court in 1930, were similar to those involved
in the instant case, it asserted that it was ". . . not in-
clined to follow the rule announced in that case, and per-
haps other similar cases.'7 In the Cochran case the Su-
preme Court upheld the validity of state distribution of
textbooks to children attending parochial schools on the
grounds that the children and the state were the primary
beneficiaries of the program, not the schools.' The court
of appeals, having rejected this rule and adopted the
Gurney rule that transportation is primarily in aid of the
school, declared that the act was unconstitutional and
void.'74
A Washington statute providing bus transportation for
the health, welfare and safety of children attending ele-
mentary schools and high schools was tested.'75 The court
pointed out that the purpose of the law was to minimize
traffic hazards to school children.' The benefits of the en-
actment were extended to all children similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law - none were
excludedy'
The supreme court held the statute unconstitutional.
Basic to the court's decision is the viewpoint that trans-
portation is primarily in aid of the school.' The court
found that the transportation of parochial school children
"... necessitates the use of common school funds for other
172 Sherrard v. Board of Education, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963, 966
(1942).
173 Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930).
174 Sherrard v. Board of Education, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963, 968
(1942).
175 Mitchell v. Consol. School Dist., 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79, 80 (1943).
176 Ibid.
'77 Ibid. The Act provided that "... all children attending any private or
parochial school under the compulsory school attendance laws of this state
shall ... be entitled equally to the same rights, benefits and privileges as to
transportation as are so provided for by (the] district school board for pupils
attending public schools."
.78 Ibid.
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than common school purposes.""' The supposition here is
that the transportation of public school children is for
"common school purposes"-that is, that this welfare
function of the state is part of the educational activity of
the public school. Thus by the simple expedient of includ-
ing state welfare programs in the public school educational
activities, all non-public school children are excluded from
the benefits of the program, though they are similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law. It must
be said that this procedure deprives the individual child
of his rights under the fourteenth amendment. The rights
of the individual child, under the equality provision, to
share in the benefits of the state's welfare enactments are
present and personal-they are in no way determined by
his attending one institution rather than another. The
mere administration of the state's welfare functions by
the public school apparatus does not.transform these func-
tions into an integral part of the educational processes.
Appellants contended that the benefits of the statute
inured exclusively to the children and their parents "in
that it simply relieves them from the obligation incident
to compulsory attendance statutes of providing transpor-
tation themselves."' 80 This contention was rejected by the
court. "We cannot.., accept the validity of the argument
that transportation of pupils to and from school is not
beneficial to, and in aid of, the school."'' Inasmuch as
Article I, section 11, of the state constitution provides that
"no public money or property shall be appropriated for or
179 Id. at 81. The provisions invoked in the instant case are WASH. CONST.
art. IX, § 2: "... . the entire revenue derived from the common school fund and
the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the support
of the common schools." Art. IX, § 4: "All schools maintained or supported
wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian con-
trol or influence." Art. I, § 11: "No public money or property shall be ap-
propriated for, or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or the support of any religious establishment. . .
:8O Ibid.
181 Id. at 81-82.
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applied to... any religious [institution] . .. ,,182 it would
seem necessary to determine whether the "benefit" and
"aid" that transportation gives to the school is an appro-
priation of "public money or property."
The court, relying heavily on the reasoning of the New
York Court of Appeals in the Judd case, left no doubt as
to its conclusions regarding the primary beneficiary of
the welfare legislation and the nature of the aid given to
the private schools. The school is the primary beneficiary:
"We think the conclusion is inescapable that free transpor-
tation of pupils serves to aid and build up the school itself."
Pupils and their parents are the secondary beneficiaries:
"That pupils and parents may also derive benefit from
it is beside the question."'"
Thus the court, implicitly admitting that the statute
made no appropriations of public money or property for
the benefit of the denominational school, invalidated the
enactment because the byproduct of the law's operation
"serves to aid and build up the school." In support of its
position, the court referred to the doctrine enunciated
in the Judd case, namely, that "free transportation of
pupils induces attendance at the school."' 4 That is to say,
the secondary, incidental, and immaterial effects of a law
providing equal transportation facilities, for all children,
irrespective of school attended, may benefit a parochial
school inasmuch as it may make it possible for some chil-
dren to elect to attend a parochial school who could not
otherwise do so. The removal of this compulsion to attend
public schools, in the thinking of the Washington Supreme
Court, serves to aid and build up parochial schools." This
L82 Id. at 81. (Emphasis added). See note 179, supra.
's3 Id. at 82. (Emphasis added).
184 Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576, 582 (1938).
(Emphasis added).
185 The incongruities are apparent. While it is quite evident that the
court made the school the primary beneficiary of the enactment, it seems
no less clear that the court's real objection lay in the incidental by-products
of the law's operation.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
secondary, incidental, and unintended effect of the law's
operation, according to the court, annuls the primary and
declared purpose of the enactment: "
... the purpose of the act is to avoid and minimize the
accidents and traffic hazards to which children of school
age are subjected in "attending elementary schools and
high schools in accordance with the laws of this state."
To avoid the incidental and unintended byproducts of
the transportation law's operation that may accrue to a
denominational school, the court denied to parochial school
children the equal protection of the laws and the free
exercise of religion. According to the demands of the clear
and present danger rule, there must be, to justify abridg-
ing religious freedom, a clear and immediate danger of an
evil that the state has a right to suppress. The "evil" in the
instant case that must be avoided is the condition of equal-
ity that enable children to choose, on the basis of religious
convictions, the school they wish to attend without suf-
fering economic reprisals. These conditions of equality,
relative to transportation, serve to aid and build up the
school the children elect to attend. To avoid these inci-
dental and immaterial consequences, the court abridged
the religious liberty of plaintiff's children.
In this holding the Supreme Court of Washington re-
jected the declared purpose of the legislature in the exer-
cise of its police power. The dissenting opinion took issue
with the majority on this score and others:'
It is... elementary that a statute regularly enacted by
the legislature, is clothed with the presumption of con-
stitutionality. When a statute is actually enacted in the
exercise of the police power, this presumption is espe-
cially strong. Indeed, in practice at least, the presump-
tion is then regarded as almost conclusive.
... it is also elementary that, in questioning the con-
1S Mitchell v. Consol. School Dist., 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P2d 79, 80 (1943).
187 Id. at 85-86.
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stitutionality of a statute, all doubt must be resolved
in favor of the legislature.
When a writ of mandamus was sought to compel com-
pliance with a later enacted statute,'as the Supreme Court
of the State of Washington, citing constitutional provi-
sions,189 resolved the question of the constitutionality of
the enactment into the query: Does transportation for
children to denominational schools constitute "support or
maintenance of such schools?"'"9 The court answered in
unequivocal terms. "In both inception and operation of
schools, transportation thereto and therefrom is a vital
and continuous financial consideration." '' Thus the court,
by making the exercise of the police power for the allevia-
tion of the burdens and dangers consequent upon compli-
ance with the state compulsory school attendance laws
an integral part of the educational operation, brought this
welfare function of the state under the constitutional pro-
visions prohibiting support of denominational schools.
This exercise of the police power for the health, safety, and
welfare of all the children of the state, regardless of
religious beliefs, was, consequently, held unconstitutional.
The purpose of the state legislative enactment was to
alleviate a need. The legislators extended the benefits of
the enactment to all the state's children similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law. None were excluded
because of their religious beliefs. The right of the individ-
ual child to share in the benefits of the legislation was
considered a personal right. Equality under the law de-
manded that the child's right to share in the welfare
benefits of the state have no dependence on the nature
18s Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P2d 198,
200 (1949).
189 See note 179, supra.
190 Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P2d 198,
203 (1949).
191 Ibid.
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or character of institutions or organizations to which he
might be attached, or at which he might attend. His ex-
ercise of religion in the choice of school could, in the mind
of the legislators, in no way disqualify him from sharing
in these benefits. Such disqualification would hamper him
in the exercise of his religion; it would be a compulsion
forcing him to attend a school contrary to his religious
convictions. In the Everson case the Supreme Court had
declared that the state cannot ". . . hamper its citizens in
the free exercise of their own religion," and that there-
fore: 192
".. . it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-be-
lievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith,
because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the
benefits of public welfare legislation."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, it will be recalled,
declared that in providing bus transportation for parochial
school children: 9
The State contributes no money to the schools. It does
not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more
than provide a general program to help parents get
their children, regardless of their religion, safely and
expeditiously to and from accredited schools.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington, on the
other hand, declared that transportation is ".. . a vital and
continuous financial consideration .... a direct, substan-
tial, and continuing public subsidy to the schools, as
such. . .. ,, The Everson decision was based upon the
distinction between welfare benefits provided for school
children, on the one hand, and public support of the school,
on the other hand. This distinction, so fundamental to
192 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
193 Id. at 18.
194 Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198,
203 (1949).
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the highest court of the nation, was rejected by the
Washington court. "To pursue such a distinction involves
semantic abstractions beyond the pale of reality."'9 5
This distinction, nevertheless, is fundamental. A person
does not lose his rights under the Constitution by joining
the Masons, or the Catholic Church, or the Lutheran
Church. He does not lose his rights by attending Southern
Methodist University, or the Hebrew Union College, or the
Catholic University of America. A person does not lose
his constitutional rights by joining the American Federa-
tion of Labor, or the Chamber of Commerce, or the Ameri-
can Medical Association. This principle is so fundamental
to the American concept of liberty and equality that it is
difficult to see how it could ever have been questioned.
Our constitutional rights are personal; neither are they
derived from membership in an organization, nor are they
lost because of membership in an organization. Member-
ship in, or attendance at, a synagogue, or church, or
parochial school, or labor union, or chamber of commerce
is not determinative of our constitutional rights.
Because the Supreme Court of Washington rejected this
fundamental principle of liberty, it was forced to conclude
that: 196
... we must . . .respectfully disagree with those
portions of the Everson majority opinion which might be
construed, in the abstract, as stating that transportation,
furnished at public expense, to children attending
religious schools, is not in support of such schools.
Since this court held that the state may not protect
parochial school children from the dangers and hazards
of highway traffic because such protection is a direct
and substantial public subsidy of the parochial schools
as such, it is interesting, if somewhat facetious, to specu-
late whether the court would bar the use of state-provided
195 Id. at 204.
-96 Id. at 205.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
bomb shelters to these children in the event of an atomic
bomb attack on the City of Seattle on the grounds that
such protection would be a direct and substantial public
subsidy of the parochial schools as such.
In contrast with the doctrine of the Washington court,
the statements of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in de-
fense of the right of parochial school children to share
equally in the welfare benefits of the state are worthy of
notice. "The state which allows the pupil to subscribe to
any religious creed should not, because of his exercise of
this right, proscribe him from benefits common to all.""'
The exercise of this right by the child does not deprive the
state of its right and duty to legislate for the child's wel-
fare. "If the pupil may fulfil its duty to the state by attend-
ing a parochial school it is difficult to see why the state
may not fulfil its duty to the pupil by encouraging it 'by
all suitable means.' "
The legislature of the State of Iowa determined to assist
the children of the state to fulfil their obligations under
the compulsory school attendance law by directing the dis-
trict school boards to provide suitable transportation for
every child of school age attending school within the dis-
trict.'99 In conformity with this statutory requirement, the
Silver Lake Consolidated School District provided trans-
portation for public school children and for children
".. . who attended a parochial school in [the town of]
Ayrshire which was operated and conducted in conformity
with the laws in the state of Iowa applicable to private
schools.
20 0
The plaintiff, consolidated school corporation, in a suit
for a declaratory judgment, argued that it was acting in
197 Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706,
710 (1941).
198 Ibid.
'99 Consolidated School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Ia. 984, 29 N.W.2d 214, 217
(1947).
200 Id. at 216.
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conformity with the express provisions of the statute
authorizing transportation, under proper conditions, for
.every child of school age and that the history of consoli-
dated school legislation in Iowa is that all children of school
age are to be transported, and that taxation for transporta-
tion cost is based on the total number of children living
in the district. 201
Plaintiff likewise raised the question whether parents
whose children are denied a legislative right because they
exercise a constitutional right have suffered an abridgment
of that constitutional right. The school district alleged:202
... the right which parents have to educate their
children in a private school, to be hollow and meaningless
unless they have the right to be transported, and insists
that the state did not attempt .. . to make compliance
with the compulsory education act possible only on the
condition that all children in rural areas attend the
public schools.
The denial of transportation in rural areas may frequent-
ly operate as a compulsion to attend the public school.
Such compulsion is incompatible with the right which
parents have to educate their children in private or paro-
chial schools if they comply with state standards.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa is based
on the supposition that to transport paro6hial school
children is to exercise directive control over the parochial
school. This supposition is, in turn, based on the thesis
that such social welfare legislation as transportation is an
integral part of the educational process, and that, con-
sequently, authority over transportation is authority over
the school itself. In line with this view, the Iowa court
found the transportation of parochial school children in-
valid on the ground that the board of consolidated school
district was not legally required to exercise jurisdiction
201 Id. at 218.
202 Tbid.
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over private schools.2 "3 Though the terms of the transporta-
tion law effectively established the district school boards
as agents of the state in carrying out a welfare function for
all the children of the several districts, the court declared
that: ". . . we are satisfied also that the power of local
boards to provide for transportation is limited strictly to
those who attend public schools."" ° Thus the individual
child was deprived of his personal right to share in state-
provided means for complying with the compulsory at-
tendance law by the submerging of his legal personality
into the character of the institution he legally attends.
Though the legislature of the State of Pennsylvania had
made no explicit provisions for the transportation of
children attending parochial schools, petitioner sought a
writ of mandamus to compel respondents to furnish free
transportation to his daughter to and from a parochial
school.205 Plaintiff alleged that there was an implied man-
datory duty imposed by the school code of Pennsylvania
to furnish transportation for his daughter since the code
compelled her to attend regularly at the school of her
choice. Defendants denied that there was any such duty,
express or implied, inposed on them.2"
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that there was
no duty implied from the school code that would neces-
sitate that the defendants furnish free transportation for
any pupil other than one attending the joint consolidated
203 Id. at 219.
204 Ibid. Though repeal by implication is not favored in Iowa unless
there is an absolute repugnancy between the new law and the old law, the
court maintained, in the instant case, that inasmuch as the reference to
transportation of children in the Code of 1946 did not specifically mention
parochial school childreri it must have been the legislative intent to exclude
them. Cf. p. 219. Here the court annulled the transportation provision of
the Code of 1939, though there was not the slightest repugnancy between
the two laws, and though the legislative history of the Code of 1946 strongly
indicates that such was not the intent of the legislature.
205 Connell v. Bd. of School Directors, 356 Pa. 585, 52 A2d 645 (1947).
206 Id. at 646, 648.
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schools."°7
Plaintiff's contention that the denial of transportation
to his daughter practically resulted in coercion to attend
a public school is not without merit.2"' Though the coercion
was not being exerted by the board of directors, it was being
exerted by the state legislature. The legislature imposed
compulsory school attendance on all children, but it con-
ditioned the right to share in the means-frequently es-
sential-forv complying with this law on attendance at a
public school. This is compulsion to attend a public school.
Such compulsion violates religious liberty and conditions
the right to share equally in the benefits of welfare legisla-
tion on conformity in thought.
The legislature of Missouri amended its school trans-
portation legislation in 1939 to ".... include pupils attend-
ing private schools of elementary and high school grade
except such schools as are operated for profit."20 9 A section
of the statute, furthermore, made provision for ". . . the
distribution of state aid [from the general funds] for the
transportation of pupils."2 ' This enactment was challenged
in 1953. The Supreme Court of Missouri,21 ' on appeal from
a circuit court, held that state funds appropriated for the
transportation of school children coalesce with the public
school moneys and could not, consequently, be used, free
of constitutional prohibitions,212 for the transportation of
207 Id. at 647.
208 Id. at 649.
209 McVey v. Hawkins, 258 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Mo. 1953).
210 ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Id. at 931. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 5 provides: "The proceeds of all
certificates of indebtedness due the state school fund, and all moneys, bonds,
lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any state fund for
public school purposes, and the net proceeds of all sales of lands and other
property and effects that may accrue to the state by escheat, shall be paid
into the state treasury, and securely invested under the supervision of the
state board of education, and sacredly preserved as a public school fund the
annual income of which shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and
maintaining free public schools, and for no other uses or purposes what-
soever."
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parochial school children.21 "We must and do hold that
the public school funds used to transport the pupils [to
the parochial school] .. .are not used for the purpose of
maintaining free public schools and that such use of said
funds is unlawful." '14 In this holding public school funds
may be used for providing the benefits of welfare legisla-
tion for some of the children of the school district, but not
for others. The classification is based on whether or not a
child has exercised his rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments to attend a parochial school. The classification
is discriminatory and violative of religious liberty.
VI.
CONCLUSION
The equal protection guaranty of the fourteenth amend-
ment demands that all children similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of a state's welfare enactments must
be treated alike. When the state, in the exercise of its
police power, provides transportation for the purpose of
protecting school children against the dangers and hazards
of highway traffic, and for the purpose of facilitating, if not
to make possible, compliance with the state compulsory
school attendance laws, the state may not exclude from
the benefits of such welfare legislation any child who is,
with respect to the purpose of the law, similarly situated
as other children. The right of the individual child, under
the equality guaranty of the fourteenth amendment, to
share in the benefits of such welfare legislation is personal.
He may not be despoiled of his personal rights because an
incidental and/or immaterial benefit may, as a byproduct
of the legislation, accrue to an institution that could not
legally be the direct beneficiary of §tate expenditures.
213 Id. at 932.
214 Id. at 933-34.
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Under the guaranties of the first amendment parents
may, for reasons of religious belief, send their children
to denominational schools. And a child may, in the exercise
of his religious belief, choose to attend a parochial school.
This exercise of religion may not be subjected to govern-
ment restraints-either by way of prior restraints or sub-
sequent penalties.
A child may not be denied a share in the benefits of
welfare legislation because of his religious beliefs. If a child
is deprived, because of his religious beliefs, of the personal
right to share in the benefits of welfare legislation, he is
made to suffer economic reprisals on religious grounds.
Such state-imposed deprivations are violations of his re-
ligious liberty and a denial of equal rights under the laws.
Bus transportation for school children is such welfare
legislation. When it is provided for the children of the
state to facilitate their compliance with the compulsory
school attendance laws, and to protect them against the
dangers and hazards of highway traffic, every individual
child similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law has a personal right to participate in the benefits of the
legislation regardless of religious belief and practice. If a
child is denied the right to share in such benefits because he
has exercised his religious belief in the choice of school
he attends, the state is violating his religious liberty. This
imposition of economic reprisals, or the threat thereof,
is a state-imposed penalty for having made the choice, or
a state-exerted pressure against making such a religious
choice. It is a penalty imposed for attending a parochial
school, or a compulsion not to attend a parochial school.
A necessitous child is not a free child. The imposition of
such penalties and the exertion of such pressures to force
children to conform in religious matters is forbidden by
the first amendment.
The several states in the exercise of their police power
have enacted a large number of distinct welfare programs
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for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, and
welfare of their citizens. Each program has its distinct and
definite purpose-a purpose that is neither determined by
nor changed by the administrative techniques used for
carrying the program into execution. To carry its welfare
program into execution, the state is at liberty to use private
agencies or public agencies. Whether the agent be private
or public, the purpose of the program remains always the
purpose intended by the legislature. The agent acts in con-
formity with the purpose of the principal.
The legislative purpose in providing bus transportation
-to protect children from the dangers and hazards of the
highways and to help them comply with the compulsory
school attendance laws-is not transmuted into the school's
distinct educational purpose by reason of the fact that the
legislature has entrusted the execution of this welfare pro-
gram to the public school administrative system. The
school system is but the agent of the government in carry-
ing the legislative program into effect. The purpose of the
program remains distinct; the purpose does not become
"education" by reason of the fact that the school has been
selected as the agent of the government to administer the
program on the local level.
By reason of the distinct purpose of the several wel-
fare programs, it cannot be rightly said, for example, that
a parochial school child may not share in bus transporta-
tion because the state constitution prohibits state aid to
denominational schools. Such a contention is based on the
supposition that all welfare programs-no matter what
their purpose-that are administered through the agency
of the public school system are in essence education and,
consequently, subject to the prohibitions of the several
state constitutions. This is to confuse the distinct purpose
of the state legislatures in the adoption of a large number
of social welfare programs with the legislative purpose
in the operation of schools. All the state's police power
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functions do not coalesce into the single notion of educa-
tion. Nor do they become "education" merely because a
public school apparatus is the convenient agent for effectu-
ating the function.
All children similarly situated with respect to the pur-
pose of the transportation legislation must be treated alike.
Underinclusive classification, that is, the exclusion of chil-
dren similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law, is discriminatory and as such contrary to the equal
protection guaranty of the fourteenth amendment.
When children are excluded from the benefits of such
welfare legislation as transportation because of their re-
ligious exercise in the choice of school, their equal rights
are denied and their religious liberty is impaired. They are
made to suffer economic reprisals and penalties because of
their religious beliefs. The imposition of such reprisals and
penalties is a governmental interference in religion, an
impelling compulsion not to exercise their religion in ac-
cordance with their religious convictions. Children who
are allowed, as they must be, to elect to attend parochial
schools but are, as a direct consequence of that exercise
of religion, made to suffer penalties and economic reprisals
enjoy a religious freedom only somewhat less restricted
than the freedom of speech in Galsworthy's description of
revolutionary Russia.2"5
Virgil C. Blum*
215 Galsworthy, American and Briton, 8 Yale Rev. 27 (October, 1918).
"Brothers, you know that our country is now a country of free speech. We
must listen to this man, we must let him say anything he will. But, broth-
ers, when he's finished, we'll bash his head in!"
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